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Section 1. Introduction
The major criticisms of the work on disequilibrium macroeconomics 1 are that (1) one
is unable to explain why firms set non-market clearing prices and given that they have done so,
(2) do the prices adjust through time to equilibrate the market and if so, how. In this paper, I
provide a simple model which illustrates that the following intuition may provide a partial answer to
both criticisms. The basic idea is that firms may learn about the market in which they compete by
observing their own sales. If their own sales provide additional information and if that information
is valuable, then the firm may use non-market clearing prices to acquire this information. This
possibility may arise because the firm may be unable to infer whether demand was just sufficient to
buy all that were for sale at the price he was charging or whether the firm could have raised its price
and still sold every unit it had produced. If the demand states are correlated, then this information
has value as the firm can make more informed choices in the future. The model provided shows that
this intuition' is supportable as an potential, partial explanation for non-market clearing pricing
and provides a (potentially) over simple explanation of the adjustment process to equilibrating
prices in the future.
An additional reason for studying this type of model is that it allows me to explore one of the
less competely studied issues in games with incomplete information, how learning through repeated
play affects the outcomes in different stages of the game.2 Within the set of games intended to
describe competition between firms, one would like to better understand how learning takes place.
This is especially important because a firm's rivals are able, by their chosen strategies, to affect
their opponent's inference problem. In this paper, I intend to focus on a relatively simple game
that allows me to study these issues.
The idea is to study a game which, depending upon an easily adjusted assumption, is either
a game of complete or incomplete information. To understand the learning effects, the game is
chosen so that when the game is a game of complete information, its equilibrium has simple, well
known properties. In fact, the game is designed so that in this case, the perfectly competitive
equilibrium price and quantity are traded in each period. The assumption is then altered so that
the game is a game of incomplete information but has the property that information obtained in
1 See, for example, Howitt [1979]. For an excellent description of disequilibrium macroeconomics, see Benassy, 119821.
2 Some papers on this subject include Riordan [19851, Kumar [1985], Mailath [1984] and Bagnoli [19871.
the previous period has no value. The differences in the equilibrium outcomes are studied and it
is shown that the differences in the firms' information results in an equilibrium price dispersion in
each period. Basically, the idea is that, in the separating equilibrium, the firms' who believe that
the demand state is good will choose a higher price than the firms that believe that the demand
state is bad. They do so because the probability of the good state conditional on their signal is
large enough so that they are willing to accept a "gamble" in which they sell none if the demand
state is bad but they sell at a high price if the demand state is good. The firms that choose the
low price do so because the probability of the good demand state (in their opinion) is low enough
given their signal that they are unwilling to take the gamble.3 However, in equilibrium, the market
clears in each period. That is, the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied at the price at
which trades occur. It is not true that all units produced are sold with probability one, though.
A more complete explanation will be provided after a brief description of the model which follows
below.
Finally, in the version of the game with incomplete information and the property that
information acquired in previous periods has value, I will show that two types of equilibria are
possible. The first is similar in nature to the equilibrium described above. That is, in each period
there is an equilibrium price dispersion and the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied
at the price at which trade occurs. The second has the property that the first period prices chosen
by some firms are designed not to clear the market. Basically, these firms opt to charge a price
which is not myopically profit maximal in order to acquire the valuable information. By charging
a price which ensures that there is excess supply in the bad demand state, these firms are able to
infer from their own sales what the demand state is. Opting to charge the price that would clear
the market under the bad demand state would not enable them to infer the demand state given
the strategy choices of their rivals. Charging such a price means that they would sell every unit
produced regardless of the demand state and thus be unable to infer it. Thus. it appears that
this equilibrium arises because the firms that choose to charge the low price pay to learn the true
dernand state by intentionally choosing a price that earns smaller first period profits. This occurs
because they do not sell every unit that they have produced. Having learned the demand state, the
second period game is a game of complete information and, as a result, the competitive equilibrium
3 There are also pooling equsilibria in which firms receiving the same signal choose different prices. Two cases arise depending
upon the exact parameter values assurned. Ins the first case, those receiving the signal thast makes the bad demand state
mnore probable all choose to charge a low price and some of the other firms choose to charge a high price, in the second
case, those receiving the signal that makes the good demand state more probable all choose to chairge a high price aw'l
some of the othser firrns choose to charge a low price.
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arises. Thus, this model provides an equilibrium explanation for non-market clearing pricing and
a (probably over simple) mechanism for future price adjustment to a market clearing price.
As I mentioned above, the objective is to study a relatively simple model in which the issues
of learning and the effects of one's opponents' strategy choices are captured. In addition, the idea
that firms might not choose equilibrium prices which clear the market is one worth exploring. To
do so requires that the model not impose market clearing as part of the equilibrium. Thus the
standard models in which the price is determined by setting the quantity demanded to the sum of
the quantities chosen or setting the quantity sold equal to the quantity demanded at the chosen
prices are inappropriate. Instead, I employ a model in which the firms choose both prices and
quantities. In particular, in each of two periods, the firms are required to first choose how many
units to produce and then choose the price that they will charge. Thus, except for the repeated
nature of the model, the timing is similar to the timing employed by Kreps and Scheinkman [1983',
Brock and Scheinkman [1985: and Davidson and Deneckre [1986:. Two important differences are
that first, they assume that the quantity choices are common knowledge at the price choosing stage
while I do not. Second, they do not admit incomplete information. This aspect of the game is
similar in spirit to the work triggered by Novshek and Sonnenschein [198O. 4 Thus, one might wish
to think of this structure as an industry with firms that must pre-produce their output and then
sell it at the price of their choosing in each period.
It is assumed that none of the firms know the true demand state which is either good or
bad and that each receives a private signal about the true demand state. Thus, firms know that
no one knows the true demand state and that each has received a private signal about it. I assume
that the signal is received after the current period's production decision is made but prior to the
current period's pricing decision. Each firm then observes the number of units that it sells at its
chosen price and the prices charged by its rivals. It does not observe the quantity that its rivals
sell. Thus, each firm uses its own sales to learn about the true state of demand, Obviously, its own
sales depend upon the pricesits rivals charge and its rivals' sales depend upon the price it charges.
It is, in this. way that the ability of a firm to learn is affected by the decisions of its riva.ls.s Thus,
the information obtained that was alluded to above is how rnany units the firmn sold.
Earlier, I alluded to the case in which there was complete information and the case in -which
4 See for example) Clarke [1983], Vives [1984], Samet [1984] and Gal-Or [1985].
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the information had no value. I can now state more clearly what each of these cases are. The
first case arises when the firms know the true demand state and this fact is common knowledge.
In this case, they play a game of complete information and I show that the equilibrium outcome
corresponds to the standard perfectly competitive outcome. The second case arise when the signals
do not reveal the true demand state (and this is common knowledge) and the demand states are
uncorrelated across periods. Then any inference a firm might make about the first period demand
state based on the quantity it sold is of no value. If it provided additional information about the
second period demand state, then it would have value. However, in the case in which the demand
states are uncorrelated, it does not have value. In this situation, the differences in information that
arise from the different signals that the firms receive results in an equilibrium price dispersion.
The second section of the paper lays out the model in detail and solves the two cases just
described. The third section of the paper solves the model when the information has value and the
fourth section is the conclusion.
Section 2. The Model and Preliminaries.
I assume that the firms produce a homogeneous, perishable product with a common cost
function, c(q). Let c(q) be continuously differentiable with derivative c' a bijective function with
c': R, -> ; ,. In addition, assume that c(O) = 0, c'(q) > Oand c'(q) > 0. Throughout, the
consumers are assumed to be perfectly informed, utility maximizers and their behavior will be
completely characterized by a demand function p = f(Q) +6, where p is the price, Q is the number
of units purchased, f'(Q) < 0, f(Q) - 0 as Q - oo and 5 E {6q,b} is a shift parameter with
69 > b. Further, I assume that the firms are indexed by i E Z [0,11 with measure m such that5
f o Ez(i)di = m(Z) = I where Ez(i) is the indicator function.
The firms make decisions in each of two periods.6 In the first period, each firm first chooses
how many units to produce, then observes a private signal on 6, and then chooses the price that it
will charge in this period. After the firms have all chosen a price, the market opens.7 In the second
5 Throughout, for an arbitrary nieasurable set A c 2, fA 2A(i)di= m(A).
GThey will be constrained to choose pure strategies.
I If the firms do not all choose the same price an assumption concerning the allocation of the low priced units is needed
Following Kreps and Scheinkman, I assume that the residual demand curve facing n high price seller is simply the market
demand curve less the number of units produced by the lower priced sellers. As Davidson and Deneckere (183i haive
shown, this is not necessarily an innocuous assumption.
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period, the firms again choose how many units to produce, potentially observe another signal, and
then choose a price. As always, an important assumption is what the firms know when a decision
is to be made. I assume that the firms choose their price without observing the quantity choices
of their rivals. Further, after units have been exchanged in the first period, each firm is able to
observe only the number of units it sold. No other market information is observable. Consequently,
unless the firm's actions allow it to infer the state of demand, it remains imperfectly informed.8
Clearly, this is a restrictive specification but it is made so that the underlying uncertainty may be
modelled in a simple way.Y
I assume that there are two possible signals, si and 82, where
1
# EProb[6 = Is1]E 1)
6 2 -Prob6 =
6 ,|82] E (0, ).
The firm that observes si believes that it is more probable that b = b9 and vice versa. I assume that
a firm observes s1 with probability 0 and that the firms' signals are independent of one another.
Further, I adopt the convention that a firm's first period type will refer to the signal that it has
observed. Thus, there are two types of firms, ti and t2, each firm's type is drawn independently
and 0 is the probability that a firm is a t1 . Finally, it is assumed that all of the above is common
knowledge.
Before solving this game, two simplified versions will be considered which serve as useful
benchmarks. The first version will eliminate all of the imperfections in the firms' information and it
will be shown that the outcome is simply the competitive equilibrium. The second version assumes
that the state of demand in period 2 is independent of the state of demand in period 1. Thus,
instead of assuming that 6 is known and unchanging through the two periods, I assume that it
is drawn independently, period by period. Contrasting this version with the results in Section 3,
highlights the effects of the possibility of learning.
So, consider the first version of the model. Here, it is assumed that 6 is known prior to the
firms' choosing their first period quantities, thereby making the signals redundant. The appropriate
6 Firms with different signals will, in general, choose different prices. Thus, some of thern will be able to use the number
of units they sell to infer the value of 6.
9 As will become clear in the next section, for any specification in which not every finm can deduce the state of demand
from observable first period market data, similar results would obtain.
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equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To find it, consider the second period
pricing decision for the i h firm. For any set of quantity choices in the second period, total supply
is Q = f1 r(i)di with p(Q) = f(Q) +6. Given Q the Nash equilibrium in the final choice stage has
every firm choosing to charge p(i) = p(Q). To see this, note that a firm's profits when the other
firms charge p(Q) are
IJpg(i) - c(i(i)) p _< p(Q)
7r (P, P(Q), i) =
1-c(iCi)) P >P(Q)
because the firm sells no units if it charges a price larger that p(Q), but sells all that it has produced
if it charges not more than p(Q). Obviously, i's best reply is to charge p' (i) = p(Q). Since this is
true for every firm, all charging p(Q) is the Nash equilibrium given q(i).10
Knowing the equilibrium set of prices charged for each Q permits one to find the second
period equilibrium quantity choices for the firms. Firm j, j E O. 11, chooses how many units to
produce to maximize
q(j) f(f (i)di) +6 - c(q(j)).
For any given set of quantity choices by firm j's rivals, the assumptions on c(q) ensure that the
second order conditions for this maximization problem are satisfied. Thus, the first order condition.
given below, defines j's best reply.
f(j (i)di) + 6 - c'(q'()) = p(Q) - c'(q (j)) = 0
0
In other words, each firm, j, chooses q' so as to equate the second-period price to its marginal costs.
This yields a second period equilibrium of (q'(j), p (Q~)) which is obviously the same equilibrium
that would have been obtained had the firms been price takers, i.e., the competitive equilibrium..
Since the firms are perfectly informed, the firms' second period profits are independent of
their first period actions. This, together with the uniqueness of the period equilibrium, implies
that the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium has the firms choosing the same output in each
period and the sarne price in each period. Thus, without irnperfect information, the outcome is
the same as the cornpetitive equilibrium which means that the sequencing of choices of quantity
and then price, and the ability to set prices are not forcing the solution away from the competitive
outcome. This result is surnmarized as Proposition 1.
10 It is straightforward to show that for each Q, this is the unique equilibriurn in this subgarne under the assumption that
the firms choose pure strategies.
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Proposition 1: When the firms are perfectly informed, in each period they set quantity such that
price equals marginal cost, and the common price charged equates demand with supply.
The second version of the model differs in that instead of assuming that the state of demand
is known and the same in the two periods, I assume that the state of demand in period two is
independent of the state of demand in period 1 and that the firms receive a#signal in each period.
Recall that, the state of demand is unknown to the firms when they choose both the quantity
that they will produce as well as the price that they will charge. Thus, there are two types of
firms in each period, those that have observed si after their production decision but before their
pricing decision. and those that have observed s2. Further, since the state of demand in period 2 is
independent of the state of demand in period 1, a firm's second period type is independent of that
firm's first period type. Here, an appropriate equilibrium concept is the extended subgame perfect
equilibrium described in Kreps and Wilson 11982j. In other words, the strategies that constitute an
equilibrium are equilibrium strategies in each subgame, where each subgame is a game of incomplete
information. Notice that because a player's type in the second period is independent of his type in
the first period, the players' beliefs trivially satisfy Bayes' rule.
Recall that 6 is the probability that si is the signal a firm observes. Thus, in period two,
the measure of the set of type 1 firms is 61 and the measure of the set of type 2 firms is (1 - 6)1.
Let T2 =-{i : t(i) = t2 }; i.e., T2 is the set of firms that receive the signal s2.
Consider the firms' second period pricing decision given any set of outputs q(j), j E [0, 1'.
As will be true throughout the remainder of this paper, the equilibrium will depend on the values of
the exogenous parameters. In particular, the equilibrium strategy choices of the firms in the second
period depend on -q(j) and on the values of $1 and 42. Define Pb(r1,'12) = f(rI Q1 + ?'2 Q2) + 5b
and"1 p,(1, 2) = f(Qi + Q2) + 6g, where Q2 = f gET2 (jdj Qi = f0Iq(j)4 - Q2 and 11k E [0,1 is
a fraction of the tk's, for k = 1, 2. In other words, r1k is the fraction of the tk's charging Pb, and Qk
is the aggregate output sold at the low and high price respectively.
11 Obviously, pg is independent of the values of r1 and '12. It is written as a function of them only to remind the reader of
the type of equilibrium under consideration.
7
Lemma 1: If '01 > pb(0,1)/pg(0,1) k212, then the equilibrium pricing strategy for a firm is
pb(0,1) t = t2
o"(t) =
pg(O,1) t = ti,
and rj = 0,r= 1.
Note that assuming that 42 pb(0,1)/pg(0,1) < 41 implies that pb(0,1) < p(0,1) and that.
the profits of a t1 firm when its rivals adopt a -(t) are
pq- c(q) p pb(0,1)
ir(p,',t1) = d1pq - c(q) pb(0,1) < p pg(0,1)
-c(q) p> pg(0, 1).
This is because the consumers are assumed to buy first from the firms charging the lowest price, and
a" has the to firms charging a lower price than the t1 firms. Thus, if b = b then, by the definition of
pb(0, 1), the t 2 firms sell all units that are demanded. Consequently, if a ti firm chooses p p(0, 1),
it is sure to sell all of the units that it has produced. If it chooses pb(0, 1) < p < pg(0, 1), it sells
all of its output in the event that 6 = S,, and sells none otherwise. Finally, if this firm chooses
p > pg(0,1), it sells none regardless of the state of demand. The profits of a t2 firm are analogous
except that 02 replaces 01.
Proof: For a"'(t) to be an equilibrium, it must be each firm's best reply when its rivals adopt it. From
the profit function above, it is clear that a firm chooses to charge either pb(0, 1) or p9(0,1).
Since pb(0,1)q- c(q)-- dpg(0,1)q- c(q)j = [pb(O,1) -41pg(0, 1))q, and pb(0, 1)/p,(0, 1) < 01.
then a ti's profit maximizing price is pg(0,1). Similarly the difference in profits of a t2 firm
is pb(0,1)q - c(q) - [42pg(0,1)q - c(q)]. Since pb(0,1)/p9(0,1) 92, its profit maximizing
choice is pb(0, 1). *
In the equilibrium described in Lemma 1, all of the t2 firms sell all of their output at a low
price and the ti firms charge a high price and "gamble" that the state of demand is '5 . If it is, they
"win" and sell all of their output at a high price. If they 'lose", they sell none. Their beliefs about
the probability that 6 = 6,are such that they prefer to take the gamble while the t2 's beliefs are
such that they do not wish to take the gamble.
Obviously, Lemma 1 does not characterize all of the possibilities. The remaining possibilities
12 Note that the dependence upon Q is captured by the value of pb(0, 1)/pg(O, 1).
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are 40 > ¢2 > pb(0,1)/pg(0,1) and ph(0,1)/p,(0,1) > 01 > #2. These are taken up in Lemmas 2
and 3 respectively. In the remaining two possibilities, given the strategy defined above, either both
types of firms prefer the gamble or both do not. The method for constructing an equilibrium in
these cases involves altering the gamble so that one group is indifferent between taking it and not.
Define a subset of T2, A' implicitly by
f(Q(A*)) + S6 = 42[f(Q) + sg]
where Q(A') fEAcT2 q(j)dj.i3 Also, let 712 be the proportion of the t2 firms in A", i.e., 712 =
m(A")/m(T2). Thus, those t2 E A are to be the firms charging the low price, pb(O,r72). Further,
since 02 < I, Pb(O, 72) = f(Q(A ")) + 4y < [f(Q) + ,] =p,(0, 12).
Lemma 2: If 01 > #2 > pb(0,1)/p (0,1), then the equilibrium pricing strategy for a firm is
pb(O,12) t = t2 and i E A'
a "(i, t) =
pg(O,r12) t = tl or t = t2 and i A',
with r1 = 0 and r2 = m( .
Proof: From the definition of A", a t2 type firm is indifferent between charging pb(0,r12) and pg(0, 712)
when all of the firms adopt o'-(i, t). Further, since (1 > 62, the ti firms prefer to charge
pg(0,72).
Now, define Ti = {i : t(i) = ti} and define a subset of TI, B" implicitly by
f(Q2 + Q(B'))+ b6b = 4)1[f(Q) + 'g
where Q(B ) gfEB cT1  (j)dj.' 4  Let 11 be the proportion of the ti firms in B', i.e., 71 =
m(B")/m(T1 ). Further, since #1 < 1, P6(71,1) = f(Q2 + Q(B")) + b < [f(Q) + , pr1E,1).
Lemma 3: If pb(0,1)|'p,(0, 1) > ¢1 > 2i then the equilibrium pricing strategy for a firm is
p(t1,1) t= t2 or t = t and i E B
Ipg(r:1,1) t =t 1 and i '
with 712 = 1 and r71 =.
13 That such a subset exists follows directly from the assumptions on f.
14 If at B' = T1, it is still true that f(Q1(B )+ Q2)+ 66> iV(Qi1+ Q2)+6g], then all firms charging pb is the equilibrium.
However, if f(P) is finite and [V(O) + $bl/[f(0) + 6g] < 1 then B* is a strict subset of T1 satisfying the definition in the
text. Hereafter, I will simply take it that B" is a strict subset of T1.
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Proof: From the definition of B', a t1 is indifferent between charging Pb (ri,1) and pg(i1, 1) when all
of the firms adopt o* (i, t). Further, since 4 1> 42, the t2 firms prefer to charge pg(O, 7/2). 1
Each of the equilibria described in the Lemmas is presented as an equilibrium in pure
strategies. In other words, each type chooses a pure strategy rather than a mixed strategy. The
equilibria in Lemmas 2 and 3 are asymmetric in the sense that some firms of one type choose a
different strategy than the other firms of the same type. Often, such an equilibrium is thought
to be unsatisfactory. Such criticism is unwarranted in this case because equivalent symmetric
equilibria in mixed strategies may be constructed from the asymmetric pure strategy equilibria
presented. For example, consider the equilibrium described in Lemma 2. A symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium which is equivalent has the t2 firms choosing p6(0,7r2) with probability 2 and
pg(0, 12) with probability 1 - 72. The t1 firms choose pg(0, '2) with probability one. An analogous
construct may be derived for the equilibrium presented in Lemma 3.
It remains to determine the firms' output choices and to show that both an equilibrium
exists and that it may be any of the types described in the previous lemmas depending on the
parameter values of exogenous variables. Since a firm has not received its signal (does not know
its type) when it chooses q, the firm chooses it to maximize its expected profits
[6#1Pg± (1 - 0)Pb]q - c(g),
for any prices P9, Pb. As before, the first order condition characterizes the profit maximizing
quantity q(Pb, Pg, k1). To show the existence of an equilibrium, it will be convenient to define
Q1(al,a2, #1,Pb,Pg) =[(1 - a1)O + (1 - a 2 )(1 - e) Iq(Pb, P9 , 4 1)
Q2(a1,a2 ,6 1 ,Pb,Pg) =[a1 6 -+a2 (1 - 6)1q(Pb, P,, di),
for a 1, a2 both contained in [0,1] and at least one not equal to zero. Obviously, we have the
following interpretation: Qi is the number of units for sale at Pg and Q2 is the number of units for
sale at Pb given #1 and (a1 , a2) which should be thought of as the proportion of the type i firms
charging Pb.
This gives
Pb(ai, a2, <1, Pg) = f(Q2) + 6b
Pg(d#1, Pb) = f(Qi + Q2) + o5g.
Note that P9 is independent of (@i,a2) because Qi -+ 92 = Iq(Pb, P9 ,#1j). The properties of these
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functions are inherited from the functions f and c, the latter because the properties of q are inherited
from c. In particular,
q(0,P,41) > 0, q(Pb,0,#1) > 0 q(P, Pg,#1) - 00 as Pb -- oo
a3q(P 9, 41) 8 q(P b,P,40 1)>0 q(Pb, P07401)--ab > 0, > (PPs#I -a P o
Thus, because f (Q) < 0, we have
8P6 (a, a2,41, Pg) 8P,(41, Pb) <0,
as well as Pb(ai,a2,q1,0) > O,P,(4i,0) > 0 and P,(4 1,Pb) -0 as Pb -+ oo,Pb(a1,c2,41 ,P,) -+ 0
as Pg - oo. Obviously, these guarantee a solution P;, P, such that
Pg (41) =f(Q2(a1,a,# 1 P;, P;)) + Sb
P;"( c1 ) =f(Q1 (a 1,a 2 , #1,P ,P;) + Q2 (a1 ,c 2, 4 1,P t, P;)) + 6 ,
which are depicted in figure 1. To complete the verification that an equilibrium exists, one simply
employs Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 to determine that for all exogenous parameter values satisfying my
P (0,1,#1)
assumptions, there are (cvi , a2) which are consistent with one of these lemmas. If ei >)>
02, then we have an equilibrium of the form described in Lemma 1. If > 62 > Pb ,(0'i) then we
th or esrbe nP (2,1
have an equilibrium of the type described in Lemma 2.15 Similarly, if ,P (0>1 1) > 2, then as
q p .P,(P9,1, 1)
argued in an earlier footnote, either there exists an ao such that 0 < al < 1 and ,. (i'1= - 16
or all firms charging Pg (1, 1,41) is the equilibrium.
As in the previous version of this model, the firms' decisions in the first period do not
affect their second period profits. In this version, this follows from the assumption that the state
of demand in period two is independent of the state of demand in period one. Thus, each firm's
second period profits are independent of the firms' first period decisions. As a result, the extended
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium has the firms adopting the strategy choices described above in
each of the two periods and this result is summnarized as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: When the states of demand are uncorrelated, one of the three types of equilibria
15 Recall that P (0, a2, 4'1)/Ig(41) - 1 as a2 -+ 0. Since #2 < 1/2, there exists an a" such that 0 < < 1 and
42= P~ (0, aj,#~1)/P ((#1). Setting a2 equal to r?2 cornpletes the demonstration.
16 This occurs if [f(0) + 6b]/[I(0) + Sg] < 4i.
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described in Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 arises in each of the two periods.
Some features of the equilibria are straightforward. In all of them, a price dispersion arises
as a result of the differential information on the firms' side rather than from the lack of perfect
information on the consumers' side. For given values of q61 and 42, as 9 increases, it becomes more
likely that P;(0, 1)/P;-(0, 1) > d1 > 42 and conversely, as 9 becomes smaller, it becomes more
likely that 41 > 62 > P(0,1)/Ps (0, 1). The reason is that 9 is the fraction of firms that see si,
and these firms are more likely to be the firms charging P9 (0, 1). In addition, for a given value of
9, the larger is #1 and the smaller is m2, the more likely it is that 01 > Pg (0, 1)/P; (0, 1) > a2.
Finally, it is important to realize for the results in the next section, that only some of the
firms are able to infer the state of demand. In all of the equilibria, the low price sellers sell all of
the units that they have produced regardless of the state of demand while the high price sellers
sell only if S = 6g. Thus, since a firm only observes its own sales, those choosing to charge the low
price are unable to infer the value of b. Their unsold stock is zero regardless of the value of 6 while
a high price seller's stock is zero only if 6 = 8g- This means that in the equilibrium described by
Lemma 2 some of the t2 firms learn the state of demand while others do not. Likewise, in Lemma
3, some of the t1 firms learn the state of demand while others do not.
3. Perfectly Correlated Demand States.
In this section, I introduce the possibility of valuable learning by assuming that it is known
that the state of demand in period one will also be the state of demand in period two, 17 and that
the only signal the firms receive is received in the first period. Under these assumptions, the firms'
types in the second period depend on more than just the signal observed in the first period. Recall
that in some of the equilibria described in the previous section, firms that had observed the same
signal chose different actions. As a result, only some of them charged the high price, i. e., only
some of them learned the state of demand. Since knowledge of the state of demand may now be
valuable, the firm's type in the second period will also depend on whether or not it has learned
the state of demand in period one. To keep the distinction clear, the firms' types in period one
will still be described by ti and t2 but in period two, their types will be described by ri, r21 and
17 The model can be readily extended to the case in which the dernand states are imperfectly correlated.
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r22 . I will identify the r1 type as a firm that has deduced the state of demand from observable first
period data, the r21 type as a firm that has not deduced the.state of demand and saw si in period
1, and the r 22 type as a firm that has not deduced the state of demand and saw s2 in period 1.
Again, an appropriate equilibrium concept is the extended subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium. To employ it, I consider the second period first. Unlike the previous versions of the game,
the firm's decisions in the first period may affect its second period profits because its decisions
partially determine whether or not the firm is a r1 type or not. One way to proceed is to solve
the second period problem for each possible specification of types and then solve the first-period
problem.
Proceeding in that fashion, assume that the set of firms that have deduced the state of
demand, A1 = {i : r(i) = r1 }. is given. The remaining firms are those that have not deduced the
state of demand and they make up the set A2 = A21 U A2 2. Let A* = m(Ak) for k = 1, 2,3. Thus,
Zk Ak = I. From the structure of the game, these firms know that any firm belonging to A1 knows
the state of demand.
Consider first the second period pricing decisions. As before, take the firms' quantity
decisions as given. Let Q2k represent that aggregate output of the T2k firms for k = 1,2, and let
Qi represent the aggregate output of the r 1 firms. Since the Ti firms are those that know the state
of demand, Qi is potentially dependent upon 5, so conjecture that it actually takes on one of two
values, Qi(6,) or Q1(66). Since the firms are unable to observe the quantity choices of their rivals,
the r2;'s cannot infer the state of-demand from the ri's quantity decisions.
Define 1
pb(al, a2) =f(Q1 (56) + cxQ21 + a2 Q22 ) + 66
Pg(al Ga2) =f(QiG(6) .+-Q21 +Q22) 9- g
As before, for ai = a2 = 1, these prices have been defined so that pb(1, 1) clears the mnarket in
the event that the state of demand is 6b and the r2j's all charge ib(1, 1). Clearly, y,(11) clears the
market if 6 = 6g and the r2's all charge pb(1, 1).
18 As in the previous section, p'g is actually independent of both 21 and a2 . It is written as a function of them only to
remind the reader of the type of equilibrium under discussion.
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Lemma 4: If j)b(1, 1)/pg(1, 1) #1, then the equilibrium pricing strategy is
0 (r2i)=Pb(1,1) i=1, 2
Ib(1,1) 3 = b
0*(ri,5) =
p9(1,1) S =S$,,
with a1 = a2 = 1.
Before proving the lemma, consider the firms' profits if they all choose to adopt the given
strategies. The profits of a type r2 1 are
pq -c(q) ppb(1,1)
ir (p, r21) = 4 1pq- c(q) j3(1,1) < P $ (1, 1)
_c(q) p > P,(1, 1).
The profits of a type _122 are similar except that the probability of selling units when pb(1.1) < p
p,(1, 1) is 2 rather than 61. The profits of a type ri firm are
p- c(q) p _<pb(1,1)71 (p,Ti,36 ) =
-c(q) p >kPb(1,1)
1pg - c(q) P C P9(1,1)
lr(p,ri,6 ,) =
_c(g) P > P9(1,1).
Proof: Since pb(1, 1)! p9(1, 1) >_ 41, both b(1,1) 2 41j,(1,1) and Pb(1,1) > o2pg(1, 1). Thus if a
r21 's rivals all adopt the given strategy, a 721's profits are maximized if it chooses p(1,1).
Finally, note that a r1chooses to charge p35(1, 1) in the event that 6 = b and ̂ ,(1,1) in the
event that 3 = 3g because each is the largest price that it can charge and sell its output in
each demand state. !
This lemma corresponds to Lemma 1 in that the firms' beliefs are such that the uninformed.
those firms that do not know the state of dermand (the T21's), prefer to ensure that they sell the
units that they have produced rather than gamble that the demand state is Sg. Since the r2: s
are not a hornogeneous group, their beliefs differ about the probability that S = 6g, implying that
for other pararneter values, other types of equilibria may exist. The remaining possibilities are
exarnined in the following lemmas. As before, the different possibilities arise for different values of
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<1, 02, Q21, Q22 and Q1. Summarizing them is facilitated by defining
r(a1, a2) b= ( -
p,(ai, a2)
In other words, for different values of ai, and a2, r(ai, a2) gives the ratio of market clearing prices
in the two demand states, when a1 is the fraction of the 721 types charging the low price, and a2
is the fraction of the r22 types charging the low price. Further, let the set of r2k charging the low
price be L for k = 1, 2. Define ai = m(L1)/m(Ai) implicitly by f(Q1( 6 b) + aQ21 -+ Q22) + 5 =
di[f(Qi(6g) + Q21 + Q22) +6g] if there is an a1 such that r(ai,1) =41.19
Lemma 5: If 41 > r(0,1) 42, or if r(0,1) > 41 > O2 and20 ~ an ai > 0 such that
01 = r(ac1,1) > P2, then the equilibrium pricing strategy is
o"(r22) = Pb(a1,1)
{ pb(a1,1) iE L1
o (r21, i) =
7"(ri,6) =(fPb@ai1) 
6 =Sb1M~galy 1) L
p,(a1, 1) S= S,,
where a 1 '= 0 if 41 > r(0,1) or, if r(0,1) > q1 then L1 is a subset of A1 such that
e1 = r(al, 1) and ai = f" i .
Proof As before, it is obvious from the profit functions that the firms will charge either pb(al, 1)
or f,(ai,1). Since 42 < r(0,1), the 22's (weakly) prefer charging pb(ctl, 1) to j,(ai,1).
Further, if 1 r(0,1) 42, the r21's (weakly) prefer to charge ',(0,1) to b(O, 1). On
the other hand, if there is an al > 0 such that o1 = r(ai, 1) > 02 then, for that value
of a1, the r21's are indifferent between charging either price. As a result, a fraction a1 of
them are willing to charge pb(a1, 1) while the rest are willing to charge g(a1, 1). Finally,
the ri's know the state of demand, and given the definitions of (a1, 1) and j,(a 1 , 1), find
that their profit maximizing strategy is as described. The reason for this is that in each
state of demand, the price just clears the market given the strategy choices of the others.
Thus, these firms can sell every unit that they have produced by charging any price less
19 Obviously, L1 is not uniquely defined by its measure. This is unimportant because any division of the set of 121 's, A1,
into Li and A1 - L1 is an equilibrium so long as m(L1) = a1. The indeterminacy is simply in the identity of which of the
identical r21 firms charge one price versus another when they are indifferent between charging either price.
20 See footnote 13.
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than or equal to the relevant market clearing price, and can sell none if they charge a higher
price. Clearly, they maximize revenues, and thus profits if they choose to charge the market
clearing price. I
The idea of this lemma may be illuminated by comparing the case where 1 ;> r(0, 1) > <2
with the case where r(0,1) > 01 > 42. In the first case, all of the r21 's prefer to gamble and
charge the high price because 41 is large enough. In the second case, if there is an a1 > 0 the
equilibrium involves a proportion of the r21 's, al charging the low price, the remainder charging
the high price and jb(a1, 1) = 1 ,(o;1,1). Thus, each of the r21 's is indifferent between charging
these two prices. 21
Let L2 be the set of T22's charging the low price. Then as shown in the previous section, if
<1 > # 2 > r(0,1) then there exists a set L2 C A2 with m(L2 )/m(A2) = a2 such that <p2 = r(0,02).
Lemma 6: If 01 > 02 > r(0,a2), then the equilibrium pricing strategy is
pb(0,a2) iE L2
o'(r 2 2 , i) =




t,(O, 0 2 ) 6 = 6g
where L2 C A2 is such that a2 = m(L2 )/m (A2 ) and q 2 = r(0,2).
The proof of this lemma is omitted but the line of argument follows replicates the reasoning
used to prove Lemma 5 with the roles of the r21 and r22 types reversed.
In all of these lemmas, the motivation for the choices made by the r2;'s is very much the
same as the motivation for the firms' choices in the previous version of the rnodel captured ini
Lemmas 1, 2, and 3. The real difference here is the choices made by the T1 firms. Their actions can
be understood by recognizing that (1) they know 6 and know the measure of the set of firms that
21 Obviously this is very similar in spirit to Lemma 3 in the previous section.
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are r21 's and r22 's, and (2) they can infer the pricing choice of the other firms from the equilibrium.
This enables the Ti's to ensure that any units that are not sold are those produced by the other
types. In other words, given S and the pricing choices of their rivals, the ri's ensure that there is
no excess supply at the appropriate market clearing price. Consequently, any unsold units must
have been produced by the r2i's who are attempting to sell them at to high a price and the r2i's
know this.
Having characterized the equilibrium second period pricing decisions, I must now determine
the second period quantity choices for the firms. Since there is no signal in the second period, the
firms' types remain as described earlier in this section.
The firms choose their second period quantity so as to maximize expected profits given
the equilibrium pricing strategies just described. As before, the first order condition for profit
maximization depends on the firm's type. That is, the quantity chosen depends upon the price
the firm will charge. Thus, if the firm is a r22, then its quantity satisfies pe - c'(q) = 0 and will
be denoted as q(pe, Ph, r22) .22 Similarly, if the firm is a r2 then the quantity chosen satisfies- either
pt - c' (q) = 0 or 4 iPh - c' (q) depending upon which of the cases described by the lemmas arises.
Again, this quantity will be denoted by q(pe, ph, T21). Finally, if the firm is a Ti type, then it chooses
g(ph, Ph. r , b) to satisfy p£C- c'(q) = 0 ifSb = Sb and ph - c'(q) = 0 if S = Sg. Note that a r1 firm chooses
a quantity that depends upon the state of demand. Since Ph > pc, q(pt,ph,r1.Sg) > q(p ,ph,r1,S).
Thus, the original conjecture that the quantity sold by the ri's depended on S is appropriate.
To facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium quantity choices, the following defini-
tions are used. Define
Q(a1, a 2 , 01,4¢2, Pe, Ph) =A1 q(pe, Ph,Ti, Sb) + ctlA21q(pe, Ph, r21) + a 2A2 2 q(PL, Ph, 22)
Qh(ai,a2, 01, 42, pc, ph) =A, q(pe, ph, 1, Sg) + (1 - ai)A21q(P, Ph, r21) + (1 - a2)A22 q(pt, Ph, T22)
Pe =f(Qe) ±+-S
Ph =f(QCh + Qg ) + 6g.
In other words, Qe and Qh are the quantities sold at the low and high prices, pe and Ph, respectively.
As before, Lemmas 4, 5, and 6 constrain the values that a1 and as~ may take on. In particular,
22 It is unnecessary to separate the quantity decisions of the r22 's that choose different prices in some equilibrium because
in the equilibrium, the firms must be indifferent between charging the low and the high price. That is, by the previous
lemmas, if the 722 's charge different prices then r(0, a~2) = 'k2 which is the same as pg=42-
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they may both be zero (Lemma 4), or if one is a fraction, the other must be either one or zero
(Lemmas 5 and 6).
As before, these may be solved for Pe(P, al, a2,qO1, 02) and Ph(P(,#01 , 02) with the following
properties:
aPe( Ph, a1, 02,#01,42) 8Ph( h, #1,402)
a ,< 0 < 0.
dPh a Pe
In addition: Pe(0, al, a 2,i, 02) > 0, Ph(0,#1, 02) > 0, Ph(Pj, 61,2) -+0 as Pe - oc.
and Pt (PA, ai,a2,#11,0 2) -+ 0 as Ph - oo. Again, these guarantee a solution (Pi, Ph) such that
P (ai,a2 , 1,6 2 ) =f(Qt(PFPT)) +-6
P;(41,6a2) =f(Qh(Pe , Ph) -+ (P[, P ) + 9.
As in the previous section, to complete the verification that an equilibrium exists, one
simply uses lemmas 4, 5, and 6 to determine that for all exogenous parameter values which are
consistent with my assumptions, there are (a1, a 2 ) which are consistent with one of these lemmas.
If 01 > r(0. 1) > 2 then we have an equilibrium by lemma 4. If 61 > $2 > r(0, 1) then, by
exactly the same argument used in the previous section, there is an a 2 such that d2 = r(0, 0 2)
which is the a2 required to satisfy Lernma 6. Also, by the argument used in the previous section.
if r(0, 1) > di > #2 then either all firms charge P. or there is an al such that r(ai, 1) = o1 thus
satisfying Lemma 5.
Before solving for the firms' first period choices, it is worth noting that the r1 firms earn
profits that are at least as large as those earned by the r2/'s. To see this, first consider the firms
that charge the low price in any of the equilibria described above. The uninformed who charge the
low price have chosen to produce (and sell) q(P , Ph,r 2 1 ) = q(Pj, P,, r22 ), which obviously satisfies
P; - c'(q) = 0. Clearly, if the r1 type knows that 6 = b. the quantity chosen is exactly the same.
Thus, if 6 = b the uninformed firms charging the low price earn the same profits as the informed
firrns do. However, if S = 6, this is no longer true because the ri firrns choose to produce a larger
quantity and sell it at a higher price than the low price firms. Sirnilarly, the uninforrned firms that
charge the high price produce the quantity that satisfies 4jPi -- c'( q) =0 for i = 1 or 2. For both
types, the quantity chosen is smaller than that chosen by the 71's when S = 3g. As a result, in this
event the inforrned firms earn larger profits than the uninformed. In the event that the true state
of dernand is 5 , the inforrned firms' profits are larger because the uninformed firrns charging the
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high price sell no units. Thus, in every possible outcome, the informed firms' profits are at least as
great as the uninformed firms' profits.
This observation explains why the firms' first period choices affect their second period
profits. For example, consider the per-period pricing equilibrium of the previous section in which
some members of a type choose to charge the low price while the remainder choose the high price.
Those choosing the high price had expected profits just equal to the profits of the firms charging
the low price. However, now that the states of demand are perfectly correlated, the firms' first
period profits are still equal but their expected second period profits differ (in expectation). The
firms that charge the high price learn the state of demand and are able to employ this information
to earn larger profits in the second period than the firms that saw the same signal but charged the
low price. Since the arguments above imply that in every second period equilibrium, the expected
difference between the profits of an informed firm and the profits of an uninformed firm is positive,
there will be two potential types of first period equilibria. Each corresponds to a different division
of the firms into second period types.
In the first equilibrium that I will present, every firm is a 1 in the second period, i.e.. every
firm learns the state of demand in the first period by observing their own unsold stocks. Every first
period pricing equilibrium will roughly correspond to one of Lemmas 1, 2, or 3.
Consider first the pricing equilibrium that corresponds to the pricing equilibrium in Lemma
1. Recall that for a given set of quantity choices q(j) j E [0, I], pb(11,rq2) = f(1Q1+ r2Q2) -=6b
and p,(rji, r2) = f(Qi + Q2) + 6, where Q2 = ET 2 q(j)j, Q1 = fIg(j)j - Q2 and r7 k E I0,1)
is a fraction of the tk's, for k = 1,2. Also, assume that there is an exogenous sharing rule in the
event that the firms' pricing decisions do not clear the market. 23 In particular, if the firms' pricing
decisions are such that there is excess supply at a quoted price, assume that each firm charging the
same price is unable to sell exactly the same fraction of the units that they have for sale. Thus, if
the price is e larger than the market clearing price, then ((e, n) is the percentage of a firm's supply
that it does not sell if it is one of the set of firms of measure n, quoting the price that is e larger
than the market clearing price.
23 Such an assumption is unfortunate. However, with no differences between the firms and a consumer sector modelled
simply as a demand function, there is no means of determining (endogenously) how rnany units a given firm is selling.
One could imagine that there is a measure of consumers each of whom chooses to purchase from any given low price firm
with equal probability. This would generate exactly the sharing rule that I impose.
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Lemma 7: If $1 (pb(0, 1) + e)/p(0,1) 4 0 2 for some e small, then the equilibrium pricing
strategy for a firm is
pb(,1)±e t=t 2
pg(0, ) t = t1,
and '1 = 0,12 = 1.
Note that the profits of a ti firm when its rivals adopt a' (t) are
pq- c(q) p < pb(0,1) -}-E
pq[1 - (1 - 41) (e, m(T 2 ))j - c(q) p = pb(0,1) + e
r(p,o, ti)=
q1pq - c(q) pb(0,1) + e < p ; pg(0,1)
-c(q) p > p9(0,1).
Since the consumers are assumed to buy from the firms charging the lowest price first, a' has the
t2 firms charging a lower price than the t1 firms. The profits of a t2 firm are analogous except the
02 replaces q1.
Proof: If all of the firms adopt the pricing strategy described, all learn the state of demand.
Consequently, conditional on this, their best reply is the price that makes their first period
profits largest. Since di 2 (pb(0, 1) + E)/p,(0, 1) > #2, for some e small, the ti's prefer to
charge p,(O, 1) while the t2 's (weakly) prefer pb(0, 1) + E to pg(0, 1). Further. if a t2 chose
to charge a price less than pb(0,1) -+ -e,it would sell every unit but would not know the
state of demand. Thus, for this firm to prefer to adopt the specified strategy, e must be
small enough so that the loss in profits of not selling every unit is more than offset by
the gain in profits from being able to learn the state of demand. Since e determines the
amount of excess supply and thus (e, m( 7'2)), and since f is continuous, then the cost of
charging pb(0,1) + e can be made arbitrarily small. Since the benefits of learning the state
of demand are strictly positive (as explained above), there is an E such that each t2 prefers
to charge pb(0, 1) + E and learn the state of demand rather than a price arbitrarily smaller
than pb(0, 1) + e given that its rivals adopt the strategy defined above. Thus, given the first
period quantity choices of the firms, there is an e such that the strategies above constitute
a first period pricing equilibrium. *
Before exploring the possibilities that arise frorn other parameter values, a few words about
the above equilibrium are necessary. First, notice that e is not uniquely determined in the proof.
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That is, there are many e's that form an equilibrium. Second, every one of them is a strong
equilibrium. That is, they satisfy all of the available criteria for robustness of an equilibrium. They
are both (trembling-hand) perfect and proper equilibria. Third, they are Pareto comparable. That
is, no firm is worse off and some firms are better off in an equilibrium with a lower e than a higher
e. Consequently, if one is willing to add Pareto efficiency into the definition of equilibrium then this
non-market clearing effect is minimized. It is unusual to do this and the fact that the equilibria
are strong Nash equilibria provides a sound basis for believing that the non-market clearing effect
is minimal.
As before, the other possibilities result in other types of first period pricing equilibria and
these possibilities are described in the next two lemmas. For this section, define a subset of T2, A'
implicitly by
[f(Q(A*)) +6b +e]l1 - (1 - 02) (e, m(A ))) = 02[f(Q) + 3gj
where Q(A) f. q(j)dj and 'q2 be the proportion of the t2 firms in A ,i.e., rl2 M2
Again, A' is defined so that a member of A is indifferent between charging the low price (and
bearing the possibility of not selling all of the units it has produced) and charging the high price
(selling units only if the state of demand is 5,). Note that the firm is indifferent because it learns
the state of demand regardless of which price it chooses and that the firm's expected, first period
profits of choosing either price are the same. From the discussion in the previous section, such an
A', a strict subset of T2 exists which makes (pb(O, '12) + )/pg(O, 12) = 62. Also for this section,
define a subset of T1, B' implicitly by
f(Q + Q(B)) +6b + e][1 - (1 - 61i);(e, m(B)) = #[f(Q) +g,
where Q(B") f g~1 (j)dj and rp1 be the proportion of the ti firms in B-, i.e., r)1 = mB)(T)
Again, the discussion in the previous section implies that either such a B' exists24 or that all firms
charge the high price is the first period equilibrium pricing strategy when (pb(O, 1) + e)/pg(o,1) >
d)I> 02.
Lemma 8: If 41 > 42 > (pb(O, 1) + e)/p0 (0, 1) for some e ernall, then the equilibrium pricing
strategy for a firm is {pb(0,92)+e t =t2 andiEA K
p,(0,ri12) t = t or t=:t2 and i "
24 See footnote 13
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with r1 =0 and r12= -
Proof: From the definition of A*, a t2 earns the same first period expected profits from charging
either pb(0,'12) + e or p,(0, r12) when all of the firms adopt o '(i, t). Since it learns the state
of demand in either case, the t2 's are indifferent between charging these prices. Further,
since 61 > 02, the t1 firms prefer to charge p,(0,'12). I
Lemma 9: If (pb(0, 1) + e)| p,(0,1) > O1 > $2 for some e small, then the equilibrium pricing
strategy for a firm is
fpb(11,1) +e t = t2 or t = t1 and i E B"
o (i, t) -
I.pg(ri,1) t = ti and i if B,
with r2 = 1 and'1=m .(B)
Proof: From the definition of B', a t1 earns the same first period expected profits from charging
either pb(r1, 1)-E or pg(r1, 1) when all of the firms adopt o-"(i, t). Since it learns the state
of demand in either case. the t1 's are indifferent between charging these prices. Further,
since o1 > 62, the t2 firms prefer to charge pb(r1, 1) - -. 
The analysis of the firms' first period quantity choices is analogous to the analysis of the
previous section. A firm's profit maximizing output choice, q(pb±e, pg), satisfies B61p9 -+ (1-8)(ph-
E)(1 - (V, n)(1 - 02)) = c'(q) where 0 is still the probability that a firm is a ti. Using exactly
the same arguments employed earlier, for each pair (r1i, 12), there is an equilibrium pair of prices
Pg T E, P9 which induce an equilibrium first period quantity choice q(P;, Pg-E).
As before, Pg (0, 1) + E and P; (0, 1) are uniquely defined. Thus, since >1 and m2 are
exogenous, they may be chosen so as to satisfy any one of the conditions for Lemmas 7, 8, or 9.
Thus, any of the three possibilities may result:
(i) all of the t2 's charging a low price and all of the t1 's charging a high price,
(ii) some (potentially none) of the t2 's charging a low price and the rernaining t2 's and all
of the ti 's charging the high price,
or (iii) all of the t2 's and some of the ti's charging the low price and the remaining t1 s
charging the high price, may result.
In all of the first period equilibria above, every firm learns the state of demand. Therefore,
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the second period equilibrium has every firm adopting the strategy choice of a r1 firm. In other
words, the second period equilibrium quantity and price choices are exactly those described in
the previous section when the complete information case was considered. There (Proposition 1),
I showed that the equilibrium is the same as the standard competitive equilibrium. Thus, this
equilibrium in the two period game has one of the first period pricing equilibria described by
Lemmas 7, 8, and 9 arising in the first period; and it has the competitive outcome in the second
period. Let pt(1i, 42) and ph(ei, 42) represent the equilibrium prices charged in the first period,
let q(pc, ph) be the first period quantity choice of the firms, and let r1 (1,02) and 12(01,02) be the
equilibrium fractions of the t1 's and t2 's charging pe in the first period. For example, if 01, 02 are
such that the pricing equilibrium of Lemma 7 arises, rn1(#1,q2) = O, r12(m1, 02) = 1, p(41, m2) =
Pg (0, 1) + e and Ph(d1, 02) = P9 (0, 1). With this notation, the equilibrium is summarized in
Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: An equilibrium has all of the firms producing q(pe, ph) in the first period, has
r1(01,62) of the t1 's and T12(01,d02) of the t2 's charging pe(01, 6 2) and the remaining
firms charging ph(61,02) in period 1, and has the firms producing q' and charging p'(Q )
in the second period.25
Before turning to a brief description of another type of equilibrium that may arise, consider
the implications of theorem 1. It says that the firms that charge the low price rationally choose to
charge the low price and avoid the gamble that the demand state is good. However, in avoiding the
gamble, they choose not to remain uninformed. They do this by choosing a price that is high enough
so that if the demand state is bad (the more likely event they believe) the quantity demanded at
that price is smaller than the quantity produced. Thus, if they sell every unit produced, they know
that the demand state is good and if not, then the demand state is bad. It is not in any firm's
short run best interest to charge this price because it would earn larger profits by reducing its
price. However, doing so ensures that the firm will not learn the state of demand and therefore lose
profits in the second period. In the equilibrium, these future losses exceed the present gains which
induces the firm to charge a non-market clearing price. In other words, they purchase information
about the demand state by absorbing, with positive probability, some unsold stock. In addition,
the equilibrium has the property that learning does occur and that the firms choose the market
clearing price in the second period. That is, there is a'very simple dynamic structure that has the
25 Recall that q" solves p"(Q") - c'(q') = 0 when Q* = fq~'diE q eI.
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firms achieving the market clearing price after having chosen a non-market clearing price. It is true
that the amount of excess supply is not large but this follows from the very simplistic uncertainty
(two demand states) that I posited. Also, the dynamic that leads to market clearing pricing in the
second period is overly simple. Again, this follows from the simple uncertainty posited (perfectly
correlated demand states) and the simple two period structure studied.
Another possible type of equilibrium in this model has the firms which charge the low price
in the first period, remaining uninformed about the state of demand. This form of equilibrium is
most easily described when the t2's choose to charge the low price in period one and the ti's choose
to charge the high price. Let 15(X 1) be the difference in expected profits of knowing versus not
knowing the state of demand in period 2 when A1 is the measure of the set of firms that know it.
One possible first period pricing equilibrium arises if 1 p9 (0,1)q > pb(O, 1)q - A(A 1) > ?2pg(0,1)q.
Lermna .10: If d1 p9(0,1)q > pb(0, 1)q-A(A1) > #2pg(0,1)q, then the equilibrium pricing strategy




and h = 0,r= 1.
Proof: Clearly, this pricing strategy leaves the t2 's uninformed about the state of demand while the
t1 's learn it. It is also clear that the firms will only choose one of p5(0, 1) or p9(0, 1). Now.
consider a t1 firm. Since it has learned the state of demand, switching to ph(O.1) results in
a loss in profits as #ip(0, 1)q> pb(0, 1)q - A(A1 ). Similarly, if a t2 switched to pg(0, 1) it
would also lose profits as pb(0.1)q - A(X1) > 52p,(0, 1)q I
It is also straightforward to characterize the first period equilibrium pricing strategies if
dip,(0, 1)q > #2p9(0,1)q > pb(0 , l)q - A(\). This is because, as in the previous case, the only
uninformed firms in the second period are t2 's as they are the only firms charging the low price.
Now let r72 be the fraction of the 12 's charging ps (0, r 2) which leaves them indifferent betwveen (a)
charging this low price, guaranteeing that they sell all of the units that they produced in the first
period but not learning the state of demand and (b) charging the high price p9(O,r'72), selling only
if the state of dernand is S, but reaping the benefits of learning the state of dernand. Further, let
the set of t2's that charge the low price be A".
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Lemma 11: If ipg(O,1)q> $2Pg(0,1)q> pb(O, 1)q-A(A1 ), then the equilibrium pricing strategy
for a firm is
pb(0,12) t= t 2 and i E A
o (t,i) =
pg(O,r12) t= t1, or i f A".
with 12 ="' A.
Analogous first period pricing equilibria exist when neither of the inequalities above are
satisfied, i.e., when pb(0,1)q - A(\,) > dipg(0, 1)q > 02Pg(0, 1)q. The equilibrium will have some
of the ti's and all of the t2 's charging the low price. The tedious statement of these equilibria is
omitted as the number of possibilities is quite large. This is because the fraction of firms which
are indifferent between charging the low price and the high price depends on which of the second
period pricing equilibria are achieved. Since bb and 6, are exogenous, they may be chosen so that
any of the second period equilibria follow the first period equilibrium pricing strategy.
Basically, all of the equilibria of this type are very similar to the equilibria when the demand
states are uncorrelated. The firms charge one of two prices. In the "separating" equilibrium, the
firms charging the low price are the firms which received the bad signal and the firms charging the
high price are the firms which received the good signal. Each chooses to charge the stated price
because, conditional on their signal, their expected profits are larger. In the "pooling" equilibria,
the type of firms that are indifferent between charging the low and high price take into account the
lost profits in the second stage from remaining uninformed. Therefore, relative to the corresponding
equilibria when the demand states were uncorrelated, the low price is, in general, higher. This is
necessary to compensate the firms charging the low price for the lost profits in the second stage
which are due to their subsequent informational disadvantage.
Unfortunately, the equilibria of Theorem 1 and these equilibria cannot be ranked by the
Pareto criteria. In the equilibrium in which every firm learns the state of demand in the first
period, the firms earn larger profits than they do in the other type of equilibrium. However, in the
second period, the profits of an informed firm decline as the number of informed firms rises. This
is because when some firms are uninformed, there are cases in which they fail to sell any units in
the bad demand state. Consequently, in this event, the informed firms sell their units at a higher
price and their profits decline as the number of informed rises. Therefore, for a firm that would be
informed in both types of equilibria, its profits in the equilibriurn with uninformed firms are larger
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than its profits in the equilibrium with only informed firms.
4. Conclusions
My objective was to consider dynamic oligopoly pricing when the firms were imperfectly
informed about their rivals. I built a model which had the firms choosing a quantity to produce
and then a price to charge in each period. They observed a signal about the state of demand
after they had produced the units but prior to choosing the price they wished to sell them for. I
began by showing that without imperfect information, the firms' decisions replicated the traditional
competitive equilibrium, period by period.
Secondly, I explored a version of the model in which the states of demand in each period
were uncorrelated and the firms received a signal about the demand state in each period. I showed
that the equilibrium was the same, period by period, and that the firms charged different prices
based on their different signals. In each period, the market cleared in the sense that every unit
for sale at the price quoted for the last unit sold, was purchased. However, if the demand state
was bad, the low price sellers sold their units and the high priced firms sold none. An interesting
feature of this version was that some of the firms learned the state of demand after the units were
sold by observing their own unsold stocks. In other words, only the high price firms were able to
infer the state of demand from personal market data.
This feature was exploited in Section 3. There, I considered a version of the model in which
the state of demand was unknown to the firms in the first period but remained the same for the
second period. In other words, if knowing the state of demand was valuable, those that learned it
in the first period could exploit their information advantage in the second period of this model. I
showed that knowing the state of demand was, in fact, valuable. The result was that two types of
equilibria were possible.
The first type of equilibrium had all of the firms, regardless of their type, pricing so that
they learned the state of demand. To do this, the firms chose to charge a low price in the first period,
chose it high enough so that they too would learn the state of demand. This was accomplished
by choosing a price that did not clear the market in the event that the demand state was bad. lIn
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other words, the firms' profit maximizing decisions resulted in excess supply of the product in the
bad demand state at the price at which trade occurs. In the second period, all of the firms had
learned the state of demand which meant that the second period decisions replicated the standard
competitive equilibrium.
In other words, profit maximizing behavior by the firms led to a positive probability of
excess supply and provided a simple adjustment to an "equilibrium" state, i.e., one in which the
market cleared with probability one. Unfortunately, the simple specification of the possible demand
states meant that the firms that chose the low price did not choose to induce very much excess
supply. A very small amount was sufficient to permit them to infer the state of demand. Having
provided an explanation for why profit maximizing firms would choose a price that would result in
excess supply (with positive probability) an explanation for a movement back to market clearing
pricing is also available. Because the firms chose the non-market clearing prices to learn the state
of demand. and because I had the very simple assumption that the demand states were perfectly
correlated. the firms choose market clearing prices in the very next period. Had it been the case that
the demand states were only imperfectly correlated, then one would have had non-market clearing
prices in all but the last period. However, the difference between the market clearing prices and
the non-market clearing prices would shrink each period. Thus, in a more complete model with
less stark assumptions, one would expect to obtain a more sensible explanation for the convergence
to market clearing pricing. Again, let me emphasize that the explanation for non-market clearing
pricing and the convergence to market clearing pricing flow from the firms attempts to learn about
their environment in a situation in which what they may learn is affected by the decisions of their
rivals. An alternate specification of the game with a more complicated demand structure is the
focus of my current research.
Another type of equilibrium was possible, in which all of those firms charging the low price
in the first period, failed to learn the state of demand. In every possible outcome, one of two things
can happen: Either the firms' beliefs about the relative probabilities of the good and bad state
were sufficient to offset the second period informational advantage of charging the high price; or
the prices were different enough to compensate the firms charging the low price for not learning
the state of demand.
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